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Should I stay or should I go? An experimental study on voter
responses to pre-electoral coalitions
THOMAS GSCHWEND1 & MARC HOOGHE2
1University of Mannheim, Germany; 2Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
Abstract. Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) are one of the most often used methods to coor-
dinate entry into the electoral market. Party elites, however, do not know how voters will
respond to the coalition formation at the polls. In this article, the authors report on an
experimental study among 1,255 Belgian students. In order to study voter responses to the
formation of PECs, respondents were presented with two ballots: one with individual parties
(party vote condition) and one with coalitions (coalition vote condition). The aim of this
experiment is to predict under what conditions party supporters will follow their initially
preferred party into the coalition and vote for the PEC, and under what conditions they
would desert the PEC at the polls.The decision whether to follow the coalition or not can be
traced back to four considerations: dislike of the coalition partner; ideological congruence
between coalition partners; size of the initially preferred party; and being attracted to a
specific high-profile candidate. (Dis)liking the coalition partner is independent from the
ideological congruence between the two coalition partners. The study’s results also show
support for an adjustment effect, as respondents became more loyal toward cartels over the
course of the 2003–2005 observation period.
Introduction
It can be assumed that political actors, in one way or another, coordinate their
entry into the electoral market depending on a number of institutional and
legal constraints. In majoritarian electoral systems, small political parties are
discouraged from participating in elections since they are unlikely to obtain
any seats and, as a result, the votes they do assemble simply will be wasted
(Cox 1997; Ferrara & Herron 2005). One of the basic, and most-often used,
mechanisms to coordinate entry into the electoral market is the formation of
pre-electoral coalitions between parties (Golder 2005, 2006). Political parties
can choose to compete with a joint manifesto, support common candidates or
strategically withdraw in favour of their coalition partner, announce that they
want to form a governing coalition after the elections, and field their candi-
dates on a common election list (Powell 2000). In some electoral systems, this
form of strategic coordination is endemic: in the run-off to the second round
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of the French elections, parties have to decide whether or not to call on their
supporters to vote for one of the remaining contenders (Gschwend & Leuffen
2005).
An obvious advantage of pre-electoral coalitions is that they allow the
partners to profit from the economy of scale that is inherent even in fairly
proportional electoral systems. In general, all electoral systems disadvantage
small parties and favour large parties when it comes to the translation of votes
into seats. In disproportional electoral systems, however, the gains of a pre-
electoral coalition can be quite considerable and comparative research indeed
shows that this from of strategic coordination is most frequent in countries
with a strongly disproportional electoral system (Golder 2005). Golder also
demonstrates that pre-electoral coalitions can hardly be called a marginal
phenomenon. In the 22 advanced industrial democracies she studied for the
1946–1998 period, there were 134 general elections in which at least some of
these pre-electoral coalitions presented themselves to the voters.
We do not know,however,whether the formation of pre-electoral coalitions
(PECs) can actually be seen as a successful coordination formula. On the one
hand, the electoral system can offer clear incentives for joining forces, but, on
the other hand, politicians are confronted with one very important source of
uncertainty: they do not know how voters will respond to the coalition. Even if
the party elite, on strategic grounds, decides that such a coalition is a promising
option, it might still be the case that voters do not feel that their views are
sufficiently represented in the new coalition. For party elites, therefore, the
problem is that theymust decide and react to incentives inherent in the electoral
system,while at the same time they are confrontedwith great uncertainty about
the likely behaviour of the voters (Andrews & Jackman 2005; Boix 1999).
At present, there is no research available on the question of how voters
respond to the formation of PECs.Under what conditions are party supporters
likely to follow their initially preferred party into the coalition and vote for the
PEC and under what conditions would they desert the PEC at the polls? The
main impediment to answering this question is that we do not have a reliable
way to ascertain what would have been the electoral fate of the coalition
partners if they had not joined the coalition. For example, in the 1986 general
elections in the Netherlands, four small leftist parties jointly obtained 3.3 per
cent of the vote, resulting in three seats in the Second Chamber. In 1989, these
four parties merged into a ‘Green Left’ coalition that obtained 4.1 per cent of
the vote resulting in six seats.At first sight this seems like a minor success, but
there is no way to ascertain the impact of the formation of the coalition itself.
Maybe these green and leftist parties would have gained votes anyway. Since
in most electoral systems voters only have one opportunity to express their
vote, no further information is available. In real-life conditions, the question of
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whether or not a coalition was successful thus can only be a counterfactual one.
If we want to find out whether voters are indeed likely to follow their party
into a coalition, it is clear we will have to rely on survey or experimental data.
In the experiment we report in this article, we try to ascertain under what
conditions voters are more or less likely to follow their initially preferred party
into a PEC.
Data and methods
We employ an experimental design to study the reaction of voters to the
formation of pre-electoral coalitions. In this experiment (a within-subject
design), we presented voters with two different electoral ballots: one with all
the political parties in Belgium included (party vote condition), and a second
with only the pre-electoral coalitions as they actually appeared on the ballots
in the 2004 regional elections in Belgium (coalition vote condition).
Belgium offers a particularly good context to study the way voters respond
to these coalitions because in 2003 the country adopted an electoral threshold
of 5 per cent of the vote at the primary district level.As a reaction to this new
electoral law, three coalitions quickly emerged. The Christian-Democrats
(CD&V) joined forces with the Flemish Nationalists of N-VA; the Socialists
(SP.A) concluded a coalition with the progressive nationalists of Spirit; and the
Liberals (VLD) introduced a common list with the small anti-tax party Vivant
(Hooghe et al. 2006a). For the smaller parties (N-VA, Spirit and Vivant), the
coalition offered an opportunity to escape the threat of the new threshold,
while the larger parties (CD&V, SP.A and VLD) hoped that the extra votes
would give them a competitive advantage in their ongoing struggle to become
the largest party in Flanders, the largest autonomous region in Belgium. Since
the creation of the autonomous region, the general rule is that the largest party
in the region can claim the post of prime minister of the Flemish government,
so there is a clear premium in emerging as the largest party in the elections.The
contest is open, since Christian-Democrats, Socialists and Liberals all score
somewhere between 19 and 23 per cent of the vote.
To conduct this kind of experiment, it is of crucial importance that respon-
dents have to make two independent voting decisions: one on a ballot without
coalitions, and one on a ballot with coalitions. Standard survey techniques do
not offer a good method for this experiment: even when employing profes-
sional interviewers, there is still a risk that the respondent will refer back to his
or her initial vote, before giving an answer to the second vote.One can assume
that respondents want to present their choices as logically coherent, so if there
is a way to retrieve their first vote, it is likely that they will cast their second
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vote in a consistent manner, and thus they will follow their initially preferred
party into the coalition. To avoid this kind of contamination, we opted for an
experiment with a web-based survey design. Using a within-subject design,
respondents were confronted with separate screens for every question, with
sufficient questions between the first (party vote condition) and the second
ballot (coalition vote condition). When confronted with the second ballot,
there was no way the respondents could get back to the vote they had cast on
the first ballot, so we assume we get a more reliably ‘sincere’ answer.
All three PECs were based on the same model: the participating parties
clearly kept their overall autonomy, but they presented their candidates on a
joint list (labelled, e.g., ‘SP.A-Spirit’). The parties also agreed on a joint elec-
toral platform and announced plans to enter coalition talks together.
The experiment was conducted with first-year university students in
Belgium, shortly after the introduction of the coalitions. A total of 1,255
students participated, in three consecutive academic years from 2003 to 2005
(Hooghe et al. 2006b). The various waves of this experiment allow us to study
more closely the dynamics of the entire process of PEC acceptance across
time. Every student enrolled in an introductory course on political science
received an email with the request to participate in the study. Only about a
quarter of all these students actually were pursuing a degree in political
science, since most of them were enrolled in other programmes (communica-
tion science, law, sociology, philosophy, area studies, etc.). The email also con-
tained a unique access code that could only be used once.All questions had to
be answered in a correct manner before the survey was labelled ‘completed’.
Students whose access code had not been used received a reminder after a
week. In the end, more then 90 per cent of all first-year students participated
in the experiment. Self-evidently, students were not taught about electoral
behaviour before the experiment was conducted, and received all necessary
information about this experiment after they had participated in it. Since this
study is based on an experiment with a very specific student sample, it should
be clear that the figures reported in the remainder of this article are not meant
to be representative as the experiment was only conceived to demonstrate the
causal processes that occur among voters in response to the formation of
pre-electoral coalitions at the polls.1
Hypotheses
When trying to model voters’ responses to the formation of a coalition, it has
to be kept in mind that voters have two options.They ask themselves whether
‘to stay’ or whether ‘to go’. On the one hand, voters could follow the party
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elites of their preferred party and, if the elites decide to form a pre-electoral
coalition, subsequently they stay within the coalition. This implies that they
vote for the PEC since the individual parties (SP.A, VLD, etc.) are no longer
represented separately on the ballot paper. On the other hand, voters could
refuse to follow their preferred party and desert the pre-electoral coalition to
which their party belongs and cast their vote for some other party or coalition.2
There are two different reasons to expect that many voters will follow
the lead of their party elites. First, if we assume that voters are instrumentally
motivated and looking for ways to optimise the effect of their vote, it seems
likely that they will follow the party elite of their initially preferred party.These
voters will indeed understand the considerable benefits of joining a pre-
electoral coalition so they will understand that their votes will not be wasted
if they join the coalition. If voters follow a seat-maximising logic, as Cox (1997:
272) argues,given their party preferences, they have every reason to vote for the
coalition. Second, following low information rationality models in political
science (e.g., Downs 1957; Lavine & Gschwend 2007; Popkin 1991), voters as
‘cognitive misers’ (Fiske & Taylor 1991) rely on heuristic shortcuts instead of
calculating complicated issue distances so that they can form meaningful
appraisals of parties without expending much cognitive effort. Based on this
literature one could speculate that it requires too much effort to evaluate the
new choice-set options, consisting of formed party coalitions, independently
from the cues providedby the elites of their preferredparty.Thus,again,they are
predicted ‘to stay’ rather than ‘to go’ and to follow their party into voting for the
relevant PEC.
Under what conditions might voters deviate from these baseline predic-
tions and not respond to the formation of PECs as the negotiating party elites
suggest? Thus far this question, which is of course crucial to determining the
success and the impact of PECs, has never been studied, so we cannot build on
earlier research. Nevertheless, the general literature on voter choice allows us
to develop five basic hypotheses based on ideological similarity, party size,
evaluation of the coalition partner, preference for specific candidates and the
time elapsed since the coalition was established.
Golder (2006) shows that the successful formation of a PEC is largely
dependent upon the ideological distance between the coalition partners. We
expect that a similar logic is electorally relevant, as well. Voters are not likely
to cast their votes for the sponsored coalition of the party they otherwise
support if they expect that there will be too many policy concessions to make.
The more congruent the ideological positions of the coalition partners, the
smaller the ideological distance and the more likely it is that supporters of the
constituent parties will support the PEC at the polls. If the ideological distance
is too large (i.e., ideological congruence is too low), it becomes more attractive
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to opt out of the PEC in order to vote for a third party that is perceived
to be more similar to the programme of the initially preferred party
(Ideology Hypothesis).
The size of the coalition partners is a crucial element in determining the
outcome of coalition bargaining since it can be assumed that the senior co-
alition partners to a large extent will be able to impose their views on the junior
coalition partners (Martin &Vanberg 2003). Most of the time, junior coalition
partners will have a hard time getting their views incorporated into the joint
platform and, for supporters of these small partners, there are therefore fewer
reasons to feel represented by themanifesto of the cartel.All three coalitions in
Belgium involved a large (CD&V, SP.A and VLD) and a small party (Vivant,
Spirit and N-VA), and the basic expectation is that the larger partner will have
the strongest impact on the common platform for the elections.All things being
equal,we can assume that small party supporters will find less of their ideologi-
cal preference reflected in the common platform than supporters of the senior
coalition partner. Therefore, small party supporters should be more likely to
desert their party’s coalition because theymight feel that the cost for not ‘going
for it alone’ is too high to justify makingmany cooperative agreements with the
coalition partner that in the end might threaten the identity of the small party.
Although small party supportersmight have stronger instrumental incentives to
consider the cartel as a survival mechanism for their party, we assume that the
ideological considerations will be more influential in determining their voting
decision.Our secondhypothesis therefore is that supporters of smaller coalition
partners more easily defect from the party strategy than voters for the major
coalition party (Asymmetry Hypothesis).
The Asymmetry Hypothesis assumes that supporters of small parties are
less likely to vote for the cartel because they find less of their ideological
preference reflected in the common platform. If one assumes, however, that
the decision to join the cartel is made in an instrumental manner, this assump-
tion does not make any sense. Basically our hypothesis predicts that ideologi-
cal distance will matter more for small party voters than for voters of the major
coalition partner.To test this assumption more directly, in some of our models
we will also include an interaction effect between the Ideology and theAsym-
metry Hypotheses.
Particularly following low information rationality models, voters could
heavily rely on likeability heuristics regarding parties or candidates in order
to make their decisions (Fiske & Taylor 1991). Even independently from
hard-to-process information like policy distances between the preferred party
and the coalition partner, party supporters will vary in how much they like or
dislike their party’s coalition partner in the PEC. This preference is not nec-
essarily related to ideological congruence—for instance, while an N-VA voter
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might be ideologically close to the Christian-Democrats of CD&V, he or she
might still dislike the CD&V because of the historically dominant position of
that party, which has caused some critics to accuse this party of an arrogant
attitude toward political power. In the same vein, SP.A voters might still dislike
Spirit, not so much because of the current programme of that party, but rather
because of the historical role of Flemish nationalism. Voters therefore might
be cross-pressured because they prefer a party, but dislike its coalition partner.
Thus we expect party supporters to be all the more motivated to desert the
coalition the more they dislike the coalition partner (Coalition Likeability
Hypothesis).
Voters, however, are not just concerned about parties and programmes, but
also about candidates. Wattenberg (1991), for example, assumes that voters’
evaluations of the personalities of candidates play an increasingly important
role in determining electoral preferences.To test the importance of candidate-
centred politics, we also include a question on the candidate the respondent
most liked. Our hypothesis is that if the most-liked candidate does not belong
to the coalition, respondents face serious cross-pressures that make them
more likely to opt out in order to vote for that preferred candidate from a
completely different party. If, however, the most-liked candidate belongs to the
initially preferred party or its coalition partner, this might serve as an incentive
to remain loyal to the coalition (Candidate Likeability Hypothesis).
It can be argued that time also plays a role in determining voters’ responses.
The formation of a PEC implies that voters, to some extent, are required to
re-adjust their mental map of the political space according to clues provided by
the party elites (Kabashima&Reed 2000).A party that was presented as being
the ‘enemy’ just a few months earlier might become a strategic partner in the
next elections. Voters need time to adjust to such coalition signals because
they need to learn how to respond to changes in the electoral environment.
We therefore expect that the likelihood of voters following their party into
a coalition should be dependent on the time elapsed since the establishment of
the PEC. We expect that the more time they have had to adjust to the new
coalition signals sent out by party elites, the more likely they will be to follow
their party elite into the cartel (Adjustment Hypothesis).
After providing some context about the Belgian case in the following
section, these five hypotheses will lead us through the analysis of our results.
The Belgian case
Belgium offers an excellent case for the study of the electoral success of PECs
since these coalitions were a new phenomenon in 2003–2004. Partly because of
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the linguistic divide in the country, Belgium has one of the most fragmented
party systems in Europe.3 This fragmentation became even stronger when the
moderate Flemish-nationalist party Volksunie split in 2000. It was feared that
this process would make it even harder in the future to form stable and reliable
coalition governments. Even now, Belgian governments are composed of five
or six parties.
One of the reforms the government proposed in 2002 to halt the further
fragmentation of the party system was the introduction of a 5 per cent thresh-
old. This measure was directed specifically against the two successor parties
of the Volksunie: the moderate Spirit and the more radical-nationalist New
Flemish Alliance (N-VA).Already before the federal elections of 2003, Spirit
joined forces with the Socialist Party, while the N-VA went to the polls on its
own, obtaining 4.8 per cent of the vote. Because of the application of the
electoral threshold at the district level, this resulted in just one seat in the
Chamber. As a result of this negative experience, shortly thereafter N-VA
joined forces with the Christian-Democrats of CD&V.This meant that only the
Liberal Party (i.e., the governing party of Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt)
was left without a coalition partner. In the end, the VLD joined forces with a
small anti-tax party,Vivant, which was not represented in parliament (Hooghe
et al. 2003).The Greens and the extreme-right Vlaams Blok were the only two
parties not involved in the process of forming coalitions. The Greens insisted
on keeping their autonomy, despite clear and persistent invitations from the
Socialist Party, while nobody wanted to cooperate with the Vlaams Blok.
When looking at the results for the 2003 federal and the 2004 regional
elections (Table 1), the SP.A/Spirit coalition at first sight looked quite success-
ful. In fact, the electoral success of this PEC served as a powerful incentive for
the formation of the other two PECs in the months following the 2003 elec-
tions. In 2004, however, the VLD suffered a clear defeat, despite its alliance
with Vivant, and the SP.A/Spirit coalition also lost votes. CD&V and N-VA
hardly gained any new voters, but they clearly emerged as the largest party in
Flanders. Subsequently, CD&V chairman Yves Leterme became prime minis-
ter of the new Flemish government.
Experimental design, operationalisation and results
In order to understand how voters responded to the formation of PECs in the
real world we conducted a vote-choice experiment using the same coalition
and familiar party name labels.We are interested to explain whether there are
systematic determinants that help predict under what circumstances voters are
voter responses to pre-electoral coalitions 563
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likely to defect from the pre-electoral coalition strategies of their party elites.
Therefore we designed a within-subject experiment whereby every respondent
is assigned to two conditions.
In the party vote condition, respondents report their vote intention when
the only options on the ballot are single parties. In the coalition vote condition,
the choice-set changes slightly. In this condition, the parties forming one of the
three PECs are only presented under the heading of their coalition, together
with the other parties that ran independently. All respondents, again, report
their vote intention for one of these options given the changed choice-set.4
In order to detect any ballot order effects, in 2005 the order of the various
conditions was randomly assigned (first party vote and then coalition vote
condition, or the other way around). The analysis showed, however, that the
order of the conditions had no effect whatsoever on the results. We are pri-
marily interested in those respondents who desert ‘their’ party (i.e., the party
they support in the party vote condition) when it is only presented as a
member of a pre-electoral coalition in the coalition vote condition.5
The figures inTable 2 represent the results of thesemock-elections.The rows
represent the voting behaviour in the party vote condition.When confronted
with nine separate parties on the ballot, 334 students voted for the Socialists
(26.6 per cent), 258 for the Christian-Democrats (21.2 per cent), 224 for the
Liberals (16.9 per cent) and 200 for the Greens (13.5 per cent).6 The columns in
Table 2 represent the voting behaviour in the coalition vote condition when the
respondents received a ballot with the PECs on it.Here,SP.A/Spirit became the
largest coalition, with 418 ‘votes’, or 33.3 per cent of the vote.
Table 1. Election results, 1999–2004
1999 2003 2004
VLD 21.7 24.2
19.8
Vivant 2.0 1.2
Volksunie 9.1 split into N-VA and Spirit
SP.A 14.8
23.5 19.7
Spirit –
CD&V 22.1 21.0
26.1
N-VA – 4.8
Agalev/Groen! 11.5 3.9 7.6
Vlaams Blok 15.8 17.9 24.2
Note: Results in percentages for: 1999 Flemish parliamen-
tary elections; 2003 Chamber of Deputies elections in Flemish
districts; 2004 Flemish parliamentary elections.
Source: Ministry of the Interior.
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In the bottom line of Table 2 we also offer a quick comparison between
participants in this experiments and young Flemish respondents (14–29 year-
olds) in the European Social Survey (2004). The comparison shows that
Christian-Democrats and Socialists are fairly well represented in our sample,
and the extreme-right partyVlaams Blok scores much better in the population
sample, while the Greens are over-represented in the experiment. In general,
participants in this experiment show the electoral preferences one would
expect in a young student sample. Furthermore, the largest differences can be
observed for the Greens and the Vlaams Blok – two parties that did not enter
a PEC and therefore do not play a role in our analysis.
When we combine the results from the party vote condition with the results
from the coalition vote condition, it is clear that the vast majority of the
respondents voted in a consistent manner. Of 224 initial VLD voters, 195
followed the cues from the party elite and voted for theVLD/Vivant coalition.
This means, however, that 29 respondents deserted the coalition, and distrib-
uted their votes among all the other parties. While the VLD/Vivant coalition
Table 2. Results of party vote and coalition vote conditions (2003–2005 joint sample)
Party vote
condition
Coalition vote condition
VLD/
Vivant
SP.A/
Spirit
CD&V/
N-VA Groen!
Vlaams
Blok Others N
VLD 195 12 9 4 2 3 225
Vivant 8 5 1 1 0 5 20
SPA 3 308 9 11 1 2 334
Spirit 3 52 4 0 0 0 59
CD&V 4 21 227 6 0 0 258
N-VA 12 2 71 2 2 2 91
Groen! 3 13 5 178 0 1 200
Vlaams Blok 1 3 6 0 35 0 45
Others 3 2 0 1 0 17 23
N 232 418 332 203 40 30 1,255
Percentage 18.5 33.3 26.5 16.2 3.2 2.4 100.0
Flanders,
population
14–29 years
27.1 27.7 22.6 6.5 16.1 – 100.0
Notes: Results of the experiments; entries are number of respondents voting for that party,
respectively, in the party vote condition (rows) and the coalition vote condition (columns).
Final rows: percentage among this sample, and percentage among 14–29 year-old respon-
dents in European Social Survey 2004 for Flanders.
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received 203 votes fromVLD andVivant, the coalition succeeded in attracting
another 29 respondents who had not voted forVLD orVivant under the party
vote condition.
The results show that 861 respondents followed their initially preferred
party into the coalition, but another 123 respondents did not. These respon-
dents allow us to determine why some voters do not follow the party elite into
a pre-electoral coalition. One could still argue that these deviations are simply
the result of a random answering pattern as respondents in condition B clearly
no longer know what they have voted for in condition A. In the remainder of
this article, however, we will ascertain whether these deviations are simply
random, or whether they follow a well-structured pattern. The 271 remaining
respondents (Greens,Vlaams Blok or ‘Others’ under the party vote condition)
are not included in the analysis.While it might be interesting to find out why
some of them abandoned their original party preference to join a coalition, the
numbers are too small to make a meaningful analysis.
Simply looking at Table 2 provides the first evidence for the asymmetry we
argued is inherent in voters’ decision making about whether or not to stay with
the PEC. Relative to the loyalists who actually follow the lead of their party
elites and cast their vote for the pre-electoral coalition to which the party
belongs, supporters of the small coalition partners (Vivant, Spirit and N-VA)
seem to desert more often than supporters of the larger coalition partners
(CD&V,SP.A andVLD).7While the junior coalition partners initially attracted
170 voters, 131 of them remain loyal to the cartel (77 per cent). The senior
coalition partners, on the other hand, attracted 816 voters, of which 730 (89 per
cent) remained loyal to the subsequent cartel.
In the following analysis, our dependent variable is ‘Coalition Desertion’,
coded ‘0’ for voters who followed their initial party into the coalition and ‘1’ for
voters that initially voted for one of the coalition partners, but subsequently
deserted the coalition in the coalition vote condition. We also constructed
several independent variables to test our hypotheses conjointly. In order to test
our Ideology Hypothesis, we needed a comprehensive measure of policy dis-
tances or policy congruence.This proved to be quite difficult since of course we
needed comparable data for all three PECs. It was especially difficult to get an
estimate for the VLD/Vivant coalition8 since, because of its small size, Vivant
is not always included in election surveys. Finally, we decided to use a double
measurement for policy congruence: one resulting from the party presidents
themselves and one relying on an estimate from our own respondents.
During the campaign for the 2004 regional elections, the Flemish public
broadcasting network (VRT) ran a number of shows in which viewers could
ascertain to what extent their own policy opinions corresponded with the
policy options in the party programmes.To make this comparison possible, the
566 thomas gschwend & marc hooghe
© 2008 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2008 (European Consortium for Political Research)
VRT asked two well-known academics to compile a list of 84 policy proposals,
and this list was presented to the chairpersons of all parties in Flanders so that
they could indicate the position of their party on each one of these issues. Since
this show,Doe de Stemtest, attracted some 800,000 viewers, or almost a quarter
of all Flemish voters, all party presidents were more than willing to accede to
this request.
The 84 policy proposals were chosen to reflect current political debates
in the country, like: ‘We don’t need any new highways’; ‘We should give more
power to Europe’; and ‘Those who receive unemployment benefits should be
forced to accept any job’. If we analyse the answers to all questions, we can
compute the correlation (pairwise) between all parties that participated in this
event. The results show that the congruence between SP.A and Spirit (corre-
lation of 0.74) is stronger than that between CD&V and N-VA (correlation of
0.66) or VLD and Vivant (also a correlation of 0.66) (Deschouwer & Nuyte-
mans 2005: 21). Assuming that those policy congruence correlations did not
change between 2003 and 2005, we get a first measure to assess the ideological
congruence of all coalition parties during this period.
Our second measure relied on mean ideological placement scores when we
asked respondents in 2005 to place each of the parties on a 10-point ideological
left-right scale. The students also place SP.A and Spirit closer together than
they did VLD and Vivant, or CD&V and N-VA.We rescaled the mean ideo-
logical placement scores to range from 0 to 1. Assuming that those mean
distances between the coalition partners did not change from 2003 and 2004,
we imputed these values for those years to get a second measure of ideological
congruence of all coalition parties during this period.
The two measures are strongly correlated (-0.80); negatively because
small mean distances with the second measure correspond to high correlations
between the coalition parties with the first measure.This strong correlation by
itself might be interpreted as confirmation of the validity of both measures:
apparently party presidents and first-year students agree very strongly on the
ideological congruence of political parties. Rather than using any single im-
perfect ideology measure, we decided to combine the two measures into one
ideological congruence score by subtracting the second measure from the first,
averaging them and then rescaling those averages to range from 0 to 1.9
Our expectation is that voters, on average, have a more or less accurate idea
about the ideological differences between two parties and thus their ideologi-
cal congruence will play a major role in the voters’ decision to vote or not to
vote for a coalition. Our hypothesis is that the smaller the ideological congru-
ence between two coalition partners, the more likely supporters of those
coalition partners will be to desert the PEC. We expect therefore a negative
‘Ideology’ coefficient.
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TheAsymmetry Hypothesis predicts that small party supporters should be
a priorimore likely to desert the PECs. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, supporters of
the junior coalition partner are in general less loyal than supporters of the
senior coalition partner. In our effort to operationalise ‘party size’, we encoun-
tered the problem that Spirit never participated on its own in elections, so
unlike for the other parties, we do not have an objective way to determine the
electoral strength of Spirit. Therefore we had to rely on a simple dichotomy
between small and large political parties. We operationalise small party sup-
porters as a dummy scoring ‘1’ if they voted for one of the small coalition
partners (Vivant, Spirit and N-VA) in the party vote condition and zero
otherwise.We expect therefore a positive ‘Small Party’ coefficient.
According to our third hypothesis, the Coalition Likeability Hypothesis, we
expect party supporters to be all the more motivated to desert a coalition the
more they dislike the coalition partner. Respondents were invited to rank all
the parties by asking them to rank their most disliked party, their second most
disliked party and so on, until their most liked party would appear in the final
position. The motivation to desert should be highest for supporters of one of
the six coalition parties (CD&V, SP.A, VLD,Vivant, Spirit and N-VA) if they
strongly dislike their party’s coalition partner. Therefore we constructed a
scale ranging from ‘0’ if coalition party supporters most like their party’s
coalition partner (after rescaling) to ‘1’ if coalition party supporters most
dislike the corresponding PEC partner. For example, an N-VA voter who ranks
CD&V as the most disliked party obtains a score of ‘1’; if CD&V would have
been the most liked party, this voter would have been assigned a score of ‘0’.
Values between the endpoints ‘0’ and ‘1’ are assigned depending on which
position a coalition party supporter ranks the corresponding coalition partner.
Support for this hypothesis is indicated by a positive ‘Coalition’ coefficient.
In order to test our Candidate Likeability Hypothesis and control for
candidate effects on respondents’ propensity to desert a coalition, respondents
were asked to choose their favourite candidate from a list of candidates.10 We
created a dummy scoring ‘1’ if the respondent’s most preferred candidate is
neither affiliated with the party the respondent supports in the party vote
condition nor affiliated with the coalition partner if the respondent supports
one of the coalition parties. For those supporters, candidate appraisals are
likely to cross pressure their party preferences.Thus,we expect the ‘Candidate’
coefficient to be positive: a voter that most prefers a candidate outside the
coalition is more likely to opt out of the coalition.
Finally, the Adjustment Hypothesis can be tested because students took
part in the experiment in three consecutive years: 2003, 2004 and 2005.11 In
order to capture the data for this hypothesis, we construct a variable that
measures the amount of time (in years) since the formation of the coalition.
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We expect, holding all other variables in the model constant, that supporters
of cartel parties are becoming less likely to desert over time. Thus, the ‘Time’
coefficient is expected to be negative.
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we present a series of four
logit models after pooling the data in order to test our hypotheses simulta-
neously. Table 3 summarises our estimation results. The models presented are
based on a number of different assumptions. In our first model, we start in a
rather straightforward manner by testing only our four static hypotheses. The
analysis shows that disliking the coalition partner strongly encourages voters
to desert the PEC,while the candidate and the small party effect are confirmed
as well. Somewhat surprisingly, although the ideology effect is significant, the
estimate is less precise than the other substantively interesting coefficients in
the model. In our second model, we additionally allow for the possibility that
the effect of ideology could be dependent on the size of the initially preferred
party by including an interaction effect between small party and ideology
congruence. This interaction effect, however, is not significant, indicating that
supporters of small parties do not respond differently than supporters of the
major parties to (the lack of) ideological congruence.
A unique feature of this experiment is that the data collection started in
2003, just after the PECs were formed in Belgium, and continued until 2005.
This allows us to test the voter reactions to those coalitions over time. In model
3 we included the dynamic time variable to assess the evolution between 2003
and 2005. The effect is strongly negative, indicating that the odds that voters
Table 3. Voter responses to pre-electoral coalitions: Predicting PEC desertion, 2003–2005
(1)
Static
(2)
Static with
interaction
(3)
Dynamic
(4)
Dynamic with
interaction
Ideology -6.700* (2.957) -4.619 (3.610) -7.623* (3.078) -5.096 (3.727)
Small party 1.023** (0.228) 6.633 (5.084) 0.998** (0.228) 8.043 (5.230)
Ideology x
small party
-6.981 (6.325) -8.771 (6.523)
Coalition 2.521** (0.291) 2.560** (0.290) 2.845** (0.340) 2.904** (0.339)
Candidate 0.766** (0.208) 0.766** (0.207) 0.806** (0.214) 0.807** (0.213)
Time -0.395** (0.133) -0.410** (0.134)
Constant 2.382 (2.382) 0.686 (2.927) 3.474 (2.487) 1.429 (3.023)
Notes: Entries are results from logit models.Dependent variable: deserting the pre-electoral
coalition. (1 = desertion; 0 = loyal). Robust standard errors in parentheses. N = 987.
* Significant at 0.05. ** Significant at 0.01. Analysis is limited to respondents who voted
for a cartel party in the party vote condition.
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desert the coalition diminish as they grow more familiar with the PEC. Inter-
estingly, when comparing with the results from model 1, none of the other
effects is reduced, so that model 3 indeed confirms all five of our initial
hypotheses. It has to be noted that the precision of the estimated effect of
disliking the coalition partner remains higher than the one of the effect of
ideological congruence. Finally, when additionally including the interaction
effect (model 4), the estimated time effect remains strongly negative while we
do not observe any major changes compared to the results of model 2.
The results listed in Table 3 confirm our initial hypotheses across several
different specifications. The stronger the ideological congruence between the
coalition partners, the less likely respondents are to desert the coalition. Ideo-
logical congruence between two coalition parties is not only important for
forming a PEC (Golder 2005, 2006), but also for voters at the polls. The
Asymmetry Hypothesis is confirmed, as supporters of small coalition parties
are less likely to remain loyal to the cartel. The most robust effect, however,
seems to be the feeling the respondent has toward the other coalition party
(Coalition Likeability Hypothesis).To put it simply: voters do not stay loyal to
the cartel if they do not like the coalition partner.The analysis shows that this
feeling is not necessarily related to ideological distance. N-VA voters might
well feel that the CD&V is ideologically close to their own preferred party, but
they might still dislike the party for other reasons. The theoretically relevant
finding here is that the feeling of dislike toward a party is not just related to
ideological distance, or left-right placement, but might also be caused by other,
cultural, historical or other idiosyncratic elements. The effect of liking candi-
dates from competing parties is clearly weaker, but it is significant: candidates
from competing parties can exert strong cross-pressures, and therefore
‘seduce’ voters into deserting the coalition. The likelihood of deserting the
PEC declined during the 2003–2005 observation period. Obviously, it takes a
number of years before voters get used to the idea of a PEC, and become more
loyal to their party elites.
Estimating the likelihood of desertion
When party elites enter a pre-electoral coalition they do not always have
reliable information on how voters will react to the formation of such a
coalition. Although it is likely that they will have gathered some information
on the perception of the cartel among their voters (Kaminski 2001, 2002), this
still does not allow them to predict future voter behaviour in a reliable
manner. With this experiment we wanted to find out why voters are more or
less likely to follow party elites into a pre-electoral cartel, and to try to
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ascertain on what grounds they take this decision. While our logit models
already give part of the answer to these questions, we can also present our
findings more intuitively. How much more (or less) likely are supporters of
particular parties to follow their party into a coalition? We will answer this
question under four different sets of (realistic) conditions derived from our
hypotheses, and generate predicted probabilities as well as uncertainty esti-
mates for those scenarios. The scenarios depend on whether voters initially
support a small party (first row in Figure 1) or a large party (second row) as
well as whether the voter’s favourite politician is affiliated with the PEC to
0
.5
1
.5 1NV-A Vivant Spirit NV-A Vivant Spirit.5 1
Small party supporter & 
favourite candidate affiliated with PEC 
Small party supporter & 
favourite candidate not affiliated with PEC 
0
.5
1
.5 1CD&V VLD SP.A .5 1CD&V VLD SP.A
Large party supporter & 
favourite candidate affiliated with PEC 
Large party supporter & 
favourite candidate not affiliated with PEC 
 ecneurgnoC lacigoloedI
Figure 1. Predicted probability of deserting the PEC, as a result of ideological congruence
and candidate likeability. Straight lines represent the point predictions; dashed lines repre-
sent the 95 per cent confidence intervals.Y-axis: Predicted probability of deserting the PEC.
X-axis: Degree of ideological congruence between coalition partners. Point predictions and
confidence intervals are calculated from the estimated coefficients of model 3 using Clarify
(Stata 9) with ‘Coalition’ set to its sample mean, and ‘Time’ to 0.
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which the voter’s most-preferred party belongs (left column) or not (right
column). For those four scenarios we determine how ideologically congruent
the respective coalition parties have to be in order to convince voters to
remain loyal to the coalition.
In all four graphs in Figure 1, the predicted probability of deserting the
PEC is on the y-axes and the degree of ideological congruence between
coalition partners is on the x-axes. The solid line depicts the predicted prob-
ability that a voter will desert the PEC, given a certain degree of perceived
ideological congruence between actual or hypothetical coalition partners.
Theoretically we would expect the line to drop from almost ‘1’ (the voter is
almost 100 per cent likely to desert) if there is no ideological congruence,
towards ‘0’ (the voter is 100 per cent likely to remain loyal to the PEC) if
ideological congruence would be ‘1’. For every graph, we also add the 95 per
cent confidence intervals (dashed lines) to the panels.12
Figure 1 illustrates that the ideological congruence of coalition partners is
generally more important for supporters of small coalition partners: if ideo-
logical congruence is low (in the figure the minimum value is 0.5), they are
more likely to desert than voters for large coalition partners. The likelihood
that a voter will desert is boosted, both for supporters of small and large
parties, as expected, if their favourite candidate is not affiliated to the pre-
electoral coalition. By looking at the various panels in Figure 1, we can ascer-
tain how likely it is that voters will follow the party elite into a pre-electoral
coalition. The predicted form of the curve indicates that ideological congru-
ence is a key element in this decision. Party elites, therefore only can take it for
granted that voters will follow their cues if there is a strong ideological con-
gruence between the parties. Voters of smaller coalition parties are generally
less loyal, while party elites should also take into account the cross-pressure
effects of popular candidates of other party or pre-electoral coalitions.
Instead of looking at the full range of hypothetical ideological congruence
scores, we now focus particularly on three measured values of ideological
congruence in our data: 0.77 for CD&V and NV-A; 0.80 for VLD and Vivant;
and 0.85 for SP.A and Spirit. Comparing both graphs in the left column shows
that across all three coalitions the respective small party supporters (likeli-
hood for desertion: NV-A: 0.28, Vivant: 0.24, Spirit: 0.17) are in general more
than twice as likely to desert the coalition as supporters of their larger coalition
partner (CD&V: 0.12,VLD: 0.10, SP.A: 0.07). Even if the favourite candidate is
not affiliated with the PEC, as the graphs in the right column show, supporters
of small parties are still about twice as likely to desert the coalition (NV-A:
0.46;Vivant: 0.40; Spirit: 0.31 versus CD&V: 0.24;VLD: 0.20 and SP.A: 0.14). In
each panel, the predicted differences between the parties are statistically dif-
ferent from zero. Generally though, given the actual measured ideological
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congruence scores, the model predicts that voters should rather ‘stay’ and
follow the lead of their party elites than ‘go’ and desert the coalition at the
polls. Based on the predicted probabilities of our chosen scenarios, only sup-
porters of NV-A or Vivant might potentially desert the coalition (the respec-
tive confidence intervals include the 0.5 reference line in the upper right panel)
when also favouring a candidate who is not affiliated with the coalition.
To summarise, party elites can in fact reasonably expect that voters will
follow their lead and cast a vote for a PEC as long as the coalition parties are
not too different ideologically. Supporters of smaller coalition partners typi-
cally find it harder ‘to stay’ loyal and vote for the PEC than supporters of the
larger coalition parties, particularly if other popular candidates exist who
cross-pressure the voters’ decision-making processes. The practical relevance
of these findings is that when negotiating a PEC, party elites have every reason
to be responsive to the wishes of the small coalition party’s supporters because
they are the first who desert the PEC.We suggest that henceforth party elites
coordinating policy proposals as well as the recruitment of political personnel
before an election should be especially attentive to the preferences of the
small coalition party supporters. Given that parties are able to make an agree-
ment on common policies, the most important point for the PEC to be suc-
cessful at the polls is that the election campaign of the PEC should focus
particularly on those politicians who are (potentially) popular with supporters
of the small coalition partner.This way the votes of small party supporters are
secured. Moreover, negotiating policy agreements that maximise ideological
congruence between coalition partners is hard to do, particularly under time
pressure in a competitive environment before an election. Therefore focusing
the campaign on politicians who are popular with small party supporters of a
given PEC allows party elites to trade this campaign strategy for harder-to-
reach policy agreements that would send their small party supporters a stron-
ger signal of policy congruence.A unique feature of this round of experiments
is that we started just after the formation of PECs in Belgium and could repeat
it in two consecutive years. Comparing the three waves of the experiment
confirms the existence of an adjustment effect, implying that loyalty toward the
cartel increases over the years.
Discussion
Thus far, the success of pre-electoral coalitions has only been studied on the
macro-level, as Golder (2005, 2006) has demonstrated under what conditions
party elites are more likely to enter such a coalition.This experiment allows us,
for the first time, to assess voters’ reactions to the formation of pre-electoral
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cartels, and in this regard a number of findings stand out. First, we find strong
effects, both of ideological congruence and of dislike of the coalition partner.
While the first effect could be expected, the strength of the second effect comes
as a bit of a surprise. It shows that dislike toward the coalition partner cannot
be explained completely by ideological congruence. The past of the party, its
image and its previous experience with power seem to have an additional
effect on the assessment of its likeability. What exactly determines disliking
a party, however, remains to be investigated. Second, we observe a distinct
difference with regard to the loyalty of supporters of the larger coalition
partner compared to those associated with the junior partner. A possible
explanation for this pattern could be that supporters of the senior coalition
partner are less concerned with whom ‘their’ party associates itself since they
assume that their party will dominate the coalition anyhow. For the supporters
of the junior party, on the other hand, this is something that cannot be taken
for granted.
Our experimental research design allows us to reconstruct to some extent
the mental map voters have of the party system. What is perhaps counterin-
tuitive is that there are many voters who would not consider voting for either
coalition partner, but who are attracted to the coalition as a whole: every
coalition attracts at least some voters who did not vote for either of the two
constituent parties. Thus the experiment offers us a glimpse of the mental
processes voters might experience when they determine whether or not to vote
for a party, or a coalition.While a lot of research has been conducted on the
question of why some voters prefer a specific party, maybe the question might
as well be how voters construct a relative ranking of parties. This would imply
that if a party gains in attractiveness – for example, by joining a coalition – this
also has an effect on the ranking of parties that are not include in the coalition
(Kabashima & Reed 2001). An alternative explanation might be that such a
ranking for some voters simply is not important, while the issue becomes more
salient for them once PECs have been brought together.
Party elites often do not have any information on what the reaction of
voters will be when they decide to enter a pre-electoral coalition.13 The Belgian
case imposes limits to our capacity to research this asymmetrical effect further.
All three PECs in Belgium were formed between a large party and a clearly
much smaller party. Therefore we cannot ascertain whether the absolute or
rather the relative size of the party is important. If the absolute size is impor-
tant, this would imply that voters for (very) small parties pay more attention to
expressive concerns like ideology and ideological congruence, and that they
are less interested in instrumental motivations of power, representation in
parliament and government and so on. The further implication could be that
voting for a small party is more of an expressive act than voting for a large
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party. If the relative size is important, on the other hand, this would imply that
our findings are not caused by size as such, but by the fact that in these cases
there clearly was a senior and a junior coalition partner. To ascertain whether
the asymmetrical effect is based on absolute or relative size, we would need a
research setting where PECs have been formed between parties of relatively
equal strength, whether they are small or large. What we hope to have dem-
onstrated in this article, however, is that in this kind of setting too, our research
design can be applied successfully.
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Notes
1. In principle, this web-based experiment could also be used in a representative sample of
the population. Participation in web-based surveys, however, usually is heavily biased
(Sparrow & Curtice 2004). It could also be argued that because of cognitive sophistica-
tion, our student sample is not ideal for an experiment like this. It has to be remembered,
however, that the experiment was conducted during the first weeks the students were
enrolled at the university, while it is also useful to know that Belgian universities do not
have an entrance examination, resulting in a broader recruitment pattern compared to
universities in other countries.
2. Theoretically voters could also just stay at home. Given that our study is placed in
Belgium, a country with a system of compulsory voting, this is not an issue.
3. Since the 1980s, Belgium no longer has national parties.There is a Dutch-speaking party
system, and a French-speaking party system, and parties do not compete across the
country. This experiment is limited to the Dutch-speaking party system since the elec-
toral threshold had clear effects only among the Flemish parties, and it was only in the
Flemish part of the country that electoral coalitions were formed. In the French-
speaking part of the country, little changed in the party system.
4. The Belgian cartels are just one of the possible pre-electoral coordination strategies that
are available to party elites. Since we wanted to reflect Belgian political reality, we did
not test other coordination mechanisms in our experiment. As such, our findings are
limited to the reactions to this specific form of pre-electoral cartels and they should not
be generalised to all other forms of pre-electoral coordination.
5. It has to be noted that the simultaneous formation of other cartels might also have an
effect on the voting decision. Moreover, because of the 2003 electoral reform, all the
cartels were formed rather simultaneously in Belgian politics. The experiment thus
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reflects real-life conditions most accurately. Also, increasing the number of scenarios
would have led to the formation of groups that are too small to be interpreted mean-
ingfully.
6. As can be noticed, the Vlaams Blok only obtained 2.9 per cent of the vote, which is far
below its actual score in Flanders of 24 per cent. Partly this is a result of the specific
student sample, but we can also assume that some students clearly did not want to reveal
their preference for the party. This kind of under-representation of the extreme-right is
quite common in election research in Flanders (Billiet 1995).
7. Moreover, it is comforting to see that being exposed to both conditions does not make
a difference for supporters of non-coalition parties. Looking at the supporters of the
non-coalition parties (Groen!,Vlaams Blok and the ‘Others’), they essentially report the
same vote intention providing validity to our experimental manipulations of the differ-
ence between the choice-sets in both conditions.
8. We would like to thank Jaak Billiet (Leuven), Wouter Teepe (Groningen) and Kris
Deschouwer (Brussels) for their help in assembling these data.
9. The results stay qualitatively the same if we use either of those ideology measures. For
methodological reasons, therefore, we opted for using the double measurement.
10. The list consisted of the following candidates: Bart Somers and Karel De Gucht (VLD);
Steve Stevaert, Freya van den Bossche and Patrick Janssens (SP); Yves Leterme, Jean-
Luc Dehaene and Stefaan De Clerck (CD&V);BertAnciaux (Spirit); Philippe Dewinter
(Vlaams Blok); Geert Bourgeois (NVA); and Vera Dua (Agalev).
11. Self-evidently, these were different groups of students, except perhaps for a very limited
number of unsuccessful students that took the same introductory course twice.
12. All point predictions are calculated from the model formula straightforwardly, using the
estimated coefficients from Table 3 (model 3) and the values of the independent variable
that define these scenarios.We, therefore, set ‘Coalition’ to its sample mean (0.15) and
‘Time’ to zero. Confidence intervals for those point predictions are calculated using the
method of statistical simulations (King et al. 2000) as employed in the ‘clarify-suite’ in
Stata 9.We took 1,000 random draws from the multivariate normal distribution with the
vector of estimated coefficients from Table 3 as the mean and the estimated variance-
covariance matrix as variance.
13. Apparently in Poland, some parties hired polling companies in order to find out whether
forming a PEC might actually benefit them (Kaminski 2001: 302, Note 4).
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